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MEDICAL ASPECTS OF THE CRIME
SITUATION*
By Franklin G. Ebaugh, M.D.
Director, Colorado Psychopathic Hospital

EVERAL months ago when I was on a train going back
east, an apparently prosperous and intelligent Californian engaged me in conversation in the Pullman. We
talked on a variety of subjects and apparently had many common interests including golf, politics and other inexhaustible
topics. This pleasant state of affairs was rudely interrupted
when he inquired as to my profession. I told him I was a
psychiatrist. He looked somewhat confused and finally said,
"Oh yes, you are one of those fellows that run around to all
the murder trials and try to make all criminals insane." On
the basis of the great general interest shown in the many recent
developments in the psychiatric field I could not help but be
astounded by such a remark, especially as it came from a
source that might represent the general feeling of the laity
regarding psychiatric work. A greater misconception of facts
could not exist. Psychiatristsseek exactly the same objectives
as are sought by other groups interested in the criminal problem; that is, protection for the community from criminal acts,
the prevention of crime and whenever possible the rehabilitation of the criminal.
We feel that more criminals should be segregated and
take issue with the legal profession regarding the present
method of fixed sentence for a crime, followed by the return
of the criminal to the community. The legal approach is
based chiefly upon a consideration of the crime committed,
*Read before a combined meeting of the City and County Medical Society of
Denver and the Denver Bar Association. Originally published in the February, 1929,
number of "Colorado Medicine" and reprinted here by permission of the Editors of
that magazine.

DICTA

seeing that the criminal receives the penalty in accordance
with the crime and that he is segregated for a fixed period of
time. The psychiatrist's point of view is chiefly from the angle
of a study of the criminal himself. We feel that a greater emphasis should be placed on an understanding of the social'and
individual factors entering into crime which is often an expression of long continued maladjustments of varying degrees.
The criminal represents one group of adjustment difficulties
and falls within the focus of psychiatry and other branches of
science. The psychiatric view holds that with scientific study
and analysis of the physical, chemical, biological, psychobiological, social and psychological factors entering into the personality of the criminal, much can be understood regarding
anti-social actions. Through a study of the entire biography
of the individual in the sense of personality assets and liabilities the real beginning of criminal tendencies can often be
found to date back to early childhood. Preventive studies during this period constitute a part of the modern psychiatric
approach to these problems. Such studies through childhood
and adolescence indicate that it is possible to foresee that certain individuals are apt to develop criminal tendencies. Early
consideration and treatment of these tendencies will mean in
many cases the prevention of criminality.
The psychiatric point of view is often more drastic than
the legal point of view in that we frequently advise permanent
segregation of individuals who are well advanced in crime,
only to find that at the expiration of a term of so many years in
prison, these individuals are allowed to return to the communities without even the formality of a mental examination.
This means that a large number, usually the recidivist types,
are willfully and lawfully turned loose on the community
without any understanding of their mental condition in spite
of the fact that psychiatric examination has repeatedly indicated the need of their permanent segregation. This group
includes particularly the constitutional psychopathic inferior
types, a group of individuals who do not profit by experience
and who show a fundamental emotional defect and a moral
unimpressionability which makes them one of the most dangerous classes to have at large. Surely the rapidly advancing
science of psychiatry would not allow us to send an insane
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person to a state hospital for so many months or years. He is
sent there to remain until his condition warrants his discharge
and the judgment of psychiatrists in the past has proven to be
comparatively accurate in safeguarding the community from
this class. The public would certainly have a good deal to
say in a critical way if the insane were discharged from our
hospitals in great hordes without examination, and yet that
same public does not realize the even greater danger of our
present legal methods concerning the parole and discharge of
large numbers of certain dangerous types of offenders year
by year. The psychiatric position is very definite and indicates
that we will never accomplish anything with the mass treatment of the criminal. He needs intensive, individual study
and treatment. Psychiatric study will not be a cure-all but it
offers, in my opinion, the only hope in sight for a sensible approach to the treatment of the offender and surely it will result in marked improvement of the present haphazard methods. We hope it may lead to the development of psychiatric
clinics in connection with our juvenile courts and all penal
institutions. We also hope that it will lead to the development in our state of a psychiatric commission composed of
three men well qualified in this field who will have an opportunity to examine completely special cases as in accordance
with the successful Massachusetts Law which provides for a
psychiatric examination of the following classes:
(1) Murder of the first degree.
(2) Persons indicted or bound over for-a felony who
(a) Have been previously convicted of a felony.
(b) Have been previously indicted for any other
offense more than once.
If the mental condition of the criminal as revealed by
complete psychiatric examination were used as a basis for his
continued detention, parole or discharge, it is certain that in
general, criminals would be longer confined than is now the
case, with the resultant increase in security to society. This
would enormously relieve the load now carried by the communities,1 the loss of billions of dollars (estimated seven billions
per year), the exposure of the public to crimes of the most appalling types. For instance, a psychiatrist advised against the
parole of a certain criminal. He also advised the creation
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of a psychiatric clinic in an eastern state penitentiary at a cost
of $18,000 per year. This criminal, after parole, caused a
fire with the resultant loss of $100,000 and the jeopardy of
many lives. Surely it would prevent the psychopathic inferior
who is constantly at odds with society from being returned
time and again to the community. This method will be possible through a psychiatric classification of all convicted criminals and by having the recommendation for parole on a scientific basis, depending on complete psychiatric studies of the
individual offender.
Perhaps it would be helpful if we would review the
psychiatric facts of one of our recent outstanding failures pertaining to the problem of crime. This is the case of Edward
Hickman whose entire history, beginning with the fact that he
should never have been born, indicates the responsibility of
the community and state for the occurrence of one of the most
atrocious crimes in the annals of American criminology. I
shall not take your time by giving a complete case history but
will attempt to call to your attention the significant details
which indicate possibilities for prevention, quoting extensively from Dr. Van Waters' report.'
The maternal grandmother was said to be insane and was
known as Crazy Becky. The maternal grandfather was
neurotic and a religious fanatic, given to temper tantrums during which he beat his horses and stamped on his plow. Maternal cousin known as Oddy Buck, the town simpleton. The
mother was insane and spent some time in a state institution.
She was a defective, as shown by examinations in the University of California Clinic during the trial, and yet she had
been released from an institution and allowed to have children.
Psychiatric Lesson No. 1. "The Hickman case indicates
that this is a problem of elementary eugenics and that Hickman should never have been born; also that when a parent
is releasedfrom an institutionfor the insane the state or a suitable social agency should supervise the patient and children
with a view to preventing mental disease." This is a part of
the present day mental hygiene program for any community.

The five children of Mrs. Hickman were brought up in
Arkansas. The mother is said to have had a morbid fear of
childbirth. The father deserted the family when Edward
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was 10 years old. Mrs. Hickman took her brood into the cotton fields where they earned a living. She constantly threatened to kill the children and often stood over them with a
butcher knife or an axe. She belonged to the shouting or
rolling sect of religious fanatics. During Edward's impressionable years, surely during his pre-school years he constantly
witnessed scenes of morbid emotional, excitement. Later he
became interested in religious problems and wished to become
a minister.
Psychiatric Lesson No. 2. What would a state wide mental hygiene program, giving special attention to the children
of insane mothers have done to prevent the murder of Marian
Parker?

When Edward was 12 or 13 years old the family moved
to Kansas City. Edward worked his way through high school.
He was president of the Webster Club, a debating society and
one of the editors of the school paper. He spent a great deal
of time in the library acquiring, no doubt, the numerous references to the classics which astonished his lawyers. Here he
read of Frank Kraemer and other criminal celebrities. It
has also been said that he sent out for books from his school
library regarding famous crimes and criminals. Toward the
end of his senior year in high school he entered an oratorical
contest, winning second prize. His lack of size, nervousness
and effeminate make-up contributed to make this a crushing
blow to him in that he had worked until 4 or 5 o'clock in the
morning on his oration. A series of severe, repeated disappointments followed. It is significant at this period that he
always wished to be in the limelight and to figure as an orator
and that he reacted very badly to personal slights and defeats.
Psychiatric Lesson No. 3. When a student in our public
schools shows symptoms of mental tension, it is always a good
thing to refer him to a child guidance clinic, to a school counselor or visiting teacher. When a student is unusually interested in crime and shows marked emotional sensitiveness along
any line, these crises in the school should stand out as danger
signals and indicate the value of wise guidance before possible
mental catastrophe.

Edward went to California in January, 1927. He worked
in the First National Bank as a messenger boy at $15.00 per
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week and lived in the home of friends. He became convinced
that he needed a motorcycle and forged four checks to the
approximate value of $100. Later, during the murder trial, it
was discovered that he was an expert forger. He could copy
his lawyer's signature so cleverly that the lawyer himself could
not identify the forgery. At this time he was taken before the
juvenile court in Los Angeles after spending several weeks in
the county jail. His probation officer investigated the case
with conscientious attention to all the details and events of
the boy's home life, school record and the opinion of his employers. Mr. Parker was especially dumfounded as he considered the boy's services in the bank were very good. Edward
was recommended for probation and released July 22, 1927.
He did not have an examination by a psychiatrist.
Psychiatric Lesson No. 4. The community should take
the blame and pay the penalty when it is willing to have the
juvenile court function without the services of a competent
psychiatrist. There is very little doubt that with complete
psychiatric examinations, if the court were willing to follow
through the recommendations of one well-trained psychiatrist
or of a group of psychiatrists, but that Edward's mental condition would have been recognized and he would have been
segregated or carefully supervised for the rest of his life. It
is inconceivable that a juvenile court in any community can
function without psychiatrists. We also see the advisability
of having a better system of probation and of seeing that probation officers receive definite training. I know of a community in an eastern state where the probation officer is 77
years old and receives a salary of $40 a month for his services.
You can imagine his effectiveness in dealing with the active
present day juvenile offenders. Psychiatric Lesson No. 4 is
certainly a bitter one. There is more to this lesson in that the
public which condemned Hickman so justifiably would be the
first to make the same outcry if a psychiatrist made a recommendation for life custody not on the basis of what he had
done but what he might do.
The last development in Hickman's gloomy drama shows
that almost immediately after this juvenile court experience
he started a career of crime. Why did the probation officer
not check up on him? He stole cars, committed numerous
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robberies and at least one murder; that of Townsend, the druggist. During this period of probation he visited Philadelphia,
St. Louis, Kansas City, Texas, Washington, D. C., and Chicago. In Cleveland he committed three street robberies in ten
minutes. In Washington, D. C., he took in all the sights and
had intended to kill the President. He stated that Providence
was guiding him all the time and warned him that to kill the
ruler of the country was too ordinary and had been done before. He then returned to Los Angeles to commit what he
termed the master crime of the century. He certainly lived
up to his desire. Edward did not know Marian Parker. She
was pointed out to him by the school teacher when he went to
the school to say that her father was ill. No one knows how
deep this delusional grudge went against anyone who occupied
a semblance of power and who could legitimately inflict humiliation. Psychiatrists speak of the mental mechanism of
projection when the patient blames others on the basis of his
own antagonistic ideas and hatred. Edward in killing Marian
was perhaps in some obscure way of getting even with his own
parent. "From the humanitarian point of view the monstrous
injustice of this staggers us. From the point of view of what
we, as a modern society, owe to the children we have permitted
to be born to us, it makes us pause."
Psychiatric Lesson No. 5. The mental mechanisms of a
crime can usually be understood and evaluated by competent
Psychiatricstudies. The early signs of a psychosis in Edward
Hickman were definite and a well trained psychiatrist in detecting them could have prevented the terrible crime committed in California.
The court procedure is of interest. First the judge refused a continuance to the defense sufficient to prepare for the
importation of witnesses from Kansas City, stating, "We will
give you 20 days to prepare and then hang him." The public,
worn out with long delays in other trials and smarting from
the criticism of the press, demanded to have the case heard
at once without too much formality. The lawyer came on
from Kansas City. It is said that moving pictures of -court
procedure were arranged for by the judge and fortunately
stopped by a committee of the Bar Association. Later the trial
was assigned to a different judge. The issue was solely that
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of insanity. The defense lawyers offered to submit the case to
a committee of psychiatrists appointed by the American Psychiatric Association. This was rejected by the prosecution
which, unfortunately, is usual. Why do courts insist on having
the ridiculous battle of so-called experts by refusing to accept
a-joint report from several competent and well trained psychiatrists? The trial took five weeks. The jury was out forty
minutes and they gave a verdict that Hickman was sane and
that he should hang.
Psychiatric Lesson No. 6. To have a jury pass upon the
question of insanity at any time is an unintelligent,unscientific,
unjustifiable, expensive and dangerous procedure. A jury
chosen from a community which has lost its sense of security
and is terrorized by a crime is like submitting a question of
science to an infuriated mob. Hickman talked freely. When
his stories were checked up they were found to be true but no
one believed him when he said he heard the voice of Providence and explained this crime by stating that he learned to
listen to this voice and act immediately for if he stopped to
consider, it was wrong. The testimony of the psychiatric army
in this case was terrible and the publicity given it even worse.
One of the prosecution alienists in the heat of the trial said to
Edward, "I would like to have you vivisected." Hickman
promptly replied, "Doctor, you are as bad is I am." The
attitude of the public was of great interest. None of the papers
printed all the facts about the real Hickman. They never told
the reader that he was an undersized, effeminate boy, looking
not more than fifteen or sixteen. Clearly Hickman was dangerous and hanging seemed the only thing to have done. Even
after confinement in his death cell he assaulted a cell mate so
severely that he had to be taken to the hospital. He committed
a major crime every six months and several minor crimes in
the concluding drama of his criminal career.
Psychiatric Lesson No. 7. "Can we expect the community to turn its attention to the causes of the crime until the criminal has been rendered no longer dangerous? We cannot think
of prevention while we are terrorized and prejudiced. Is it
not reasonable to ask the court, the press and the psychiatrists
to present the whole truth to the end that our abhorrence may
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be fastened upon the causes which produced the deed rather
than upon the criminal himself?"

I have quoted and abstracted largely from the accurate
report of "Why Hickman Hangs," written by Dr. Miriam
Van Waters. I do not know of any case that so clearly brings
out many of the leading psychiatric aspects of dealing with
the crime situation. I will not burden you by quoting an even
more remarkable case, especially from the viewpoint of legal
procedure; that of the acquittal of George Remus in Cincinnati.

He was found sane by the psychiatrists and insane by

the jury. These two cases when combined with the LeopoldLoeb medico-legal atrocity several years ago, indicate that
changes are needed in our legal and medical machinery. Fortunately changes are rapidly being developed by some of our
eastern states. The Baumes Laws enacted by the New York
Legislature in 1926 chiefly provide for life imprisonment of
all offenders on their fourth sentence. For second offenders
the minimum sentence must equal the maximum that they
could have received for the first offense and the maximum of
what may not exceed twice the length of that term.
Since these laws went into effect in July, 1926, uniform
testimony of their success has been obtained from all quarters." '

Quoting from the Crime Commission report of Feb-

ruary 28, 1927, we have the following remarkable testimony of
their success: Just before this law went into effect there is a
description of a bums' rush to prison, the most remarkable
spectacle ever seen in this country. Prisoners began changing
their pleas from not guilty to guilty. They insisted on helping
the district attorneys, the courts and the state in every way
possible in order to get into Sing Sing before midnight of
Wednesday, June 30th. In many instances the criminals themselves studied these laws carefully and they certainly feared
them, demanding speedy trials and fast trains to Sing Sing.
Police Commissioner McLaughlin in his recently published
annual report, referring to the Baumes Laws, says, "The
Police Department's experience since this law and the other
so-called Baumes Laws took effect, leads us to the positive
conclusion that up to date they have had a very deterrent
effect on individuals pursuing a criminal course. Our experience is based on actual contact with criminals, and from
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the information disclosed to the police it is evident that criminals have a genuine fear of these laws." He testified before
the Crime Commission that during the months of July, August
and September of 1926 there were 161 fewer robberies in
New York City than in the corresponding months of 1925, a
decrease of 45 per cent in this one class of crime alone in this
short period. He also testified that in cases of assault and robbery in that same period there had been a decrease of SO per
cent, there having been but 42 such crimes reported to the
police in that period, as against 87 the year before. Previous
to the Baumes Laws this class of crime was clearly on the increase in New York, for instance, in the first six months of
1926, the number of assault and robbery cases in Manhattan
jumped to 501, as against 425 for the same period in 1925.
Police Commissioner McLaughlin states that there is no doubt
but that the Baumes Laws reaches the habitual criminal with
a long known record. He also states that this type of criminal
cannot be changed by reform; that he has succeeded in beating
the case year after year, starting with a petty crime and continuing his career of crime with more serious crimes, even
killing policemen when he feels that it is necessary. He states
that the Baumes Laws have effectively aided the police department. When a gunman with a long record knows in advance
that if he is caught it means life imprisonment or an added
sentence for using a gun without any chance to sway the court
by promises of good behavior or to beat a stiff sentence with a
plea of guilty, its effectiveness will be even more apparent.
District attorneys within New York City testified also that the
Baumes Laws have been a marked crime deterrent, where
there has been a decrease of 40 per cent as compared with the
corresponding period of the preceding year. The statistics
collected and published week by week in one of the great
metropolitan dailies showing the extent of major crimes in
other cities are equally illuminating testimony to the success
of these laws in keeping down crime in New York City. They
show the following proportionate rate of crime per 100,000
population: New York, 4.7; Chicago, 9.6; Philadelphia,
16.5; Detroit, 28.9; Los Angeles, 20.8; St. Louis, 18.5; San
Francisco, 30.8; Toledo, 24.7.
Statistics from Warden Crawford of the Colorado State
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Penitentiary show for the biennial period ending Nov. 30,
1926, there were 197 repeaters out of 1,014 received (19.4
per cent), and for the biennial period ending November 30,
1928, there were 318 repeaters out of 1,062 received (29.8 per
cent.) We cannot continue having a merry-go-round of in and
out of the penitentiary increasing year by year. The statistics
I have quoted regarding the Baumes Law probably are misleading in that professional and habitual criminals are leaving
New York and Michigan and migrating to Colorado and
other states.
The surety companies whose business it is to write policies
for burglary and robbery insurance give the following statement: Robbery, burglary and hold-up losses have been reduced. 29 per cent. In the last six months of 1925 insurance
paid in greater New York was $135,607.97. In the closing
half of the year during which the Baumes Laws were in effect
claims paid amounted to $96,091.68.
The warden at Sing Sing testifies that these laws are serving as a deterrent in that the number of fourth offenders has
decreased in number by 46 per cent in the five months' period
during which the laws were in operation. It also has a general
effect in reducing the number of new prisoners as evidenced by
the fact that during the month of October there were only 110
new prisoners received in Sing Sing as compared with 141
in the same month the year previous.
Letters sent to 62 district attorneys and county judges
throughout the' state of New York indicate a predominant
support of the Baumes Laws. Justice William H. Black of
the Supreme Court states, "Had work of this kind been done
twenty years ago, the taxpayers of the state would not now be
bearing the burden of housing and feeding an army of professional criminals, nor would they be paying pensions to maimed
and murdered officers of the law and their dependent families."
What would the Baumes Laws have accomplished in the
case of Eddy Ives, a habitual criminal? The findings in this
case are as follows:
1. The Denver City Charities have a record of this individual dating from early childhood showing advanced and
progressive criminal tendencies.
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2. The police and court records show that he began his
criminal career in 1898 and received a suspended sentence to
the State Industrial School at Golden. In 1904 he was sent
to the State Reformatory at Buena. Vista for grand larceny.
In 1906 he started a 3-year term in the Oregon State Prison. In
1914 he was in prison in Salt Lake City for burglary. In 1916
he was sent to Canon City for ten years for burglary. In 1920
he escaped from Canon City and after another robbery was
returned. In 1924 received another term there. In 1927 went
back again. Reasons for parole both times from Canon City
were not ascertained. On November 16, 1928, he killed a
splendid policeman and a negro woman.
Suppose Ives -is not hung but receives another prolonged
sentence. In how many years will he be again free to continue
his burglary and homicidal acts? Surely with a psychiatric
classification of offenders and complete studies before parole
this crime and many similar crimes could have been prevented.
How many similar cases are now at large in Colorado and
would it not be worth while to develop careful statistical
studies, probation and methods of follow-up and scientific
parole of criminals?
In the preparation of this paper I was surprised to learn
that statistics from the West Side Court were not available and
that the information for which I asked about the number of
criminal repeaters each year, the type of sentences received,
could not be obtained.
I have indicated in this paper the absurdity of many
medico-legal procedures now in vogue. Surely the day of
the so-called battle of experts is passing and is condemned by
all representatives of the public and professionalgroups. The
psychiatric field for decades has realized the defects in this
system, both on the medical side and from the viewpoint of
cumbersome, time consuming, sleep wrecking; legal technicalities, apparently unchanged for centuries. Is it possible for
a psychiatrist called for the prosecution or for the defense to
give non-partisan testimony when these procedures continue
to be used? Is it possible for a jury to pass on detailed medical questions regarding insanity which require careful scientific study and years of training to decide? Is it possible,
allowing for a certain degree of intelligence in psychiatrists
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and the public in general, that the obsolete and very annoying
hypothetical question can be endured even by the most patient
of us? These procedures have been strongly condemned by
committee action of the American Psychiatric Association. '-7
Medical considerations are brushed aside with a startling deliberateness not flattering to the psychiatrists of our community
or to the staff of your Psychopathic Hospital. Years of experience in psychiatry, close study, research and some understanding of the medical phase of this situation carry no weight
in many instances and the jury decides puzzzling, difficult,
complicated medical issues. Would it not be equally sensible
to have the jury decide about the localization of a brain tumor
or the indications for an appendix or gall bladder operation as
well as the type of instruments the trained surgeon should use?
The Colorado Law of 1927 whereby criminals making a
plea of insanity may be sent for observation to the Psychopathic or State Hospital has been often quoted as an improvement in this situation- Possibly so for a legal weapon, but it
is deplorable to mix criminals with early and remediable
types of mental disease and defects, the purpose for which the
State Psychopathic Hospital was provided. It indicates a return to the medieval idea of grouping individuals having mental disorders with criminals. I cannot object too strenuously
to this mixture and feel the state should provide separate
quarters for the observation of criminal cases. A separate institution for the observation of the criminal insane should be
provided in connection with our penal institutions. Despite
the fact that we have no building, room, facilities or personnel
for this purpose, we have arranged facilities on two of our six
wards and handled this problem as well as we could along
with the admission rate of approximately 700 patients annually, making our Psychopathic Hospital, I am glad to say, the
second active one in the country as far as service to the entire
state is concerned.
Since the 1927 law went into effect forty cases have been
received at the State Psychopathic Hospital. Recommendations given to the court were followed out in 57.5 per cent;
they were not followed out in 17.5 per cent; no action of the
court in 25 per cent.
In one case, that of S. F., a man who was diagnosed as
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having a paranoid psychosis, studied very carefully and a report in agreement submitted by Dr. Delehanty and myself,
nothing was accomplished in that the prejudice of the local
community and the legal procedure through the jury promptly decided the issue. This man received a sentence of nine
years in the state penitentiary. He is definitely psychotic and
I think at least nine out of ten psychiatrists would agree with
our opinion. At least it was not the type of a case that offers
many controversial possibilities.
At the end of a few years this individual, in accordance
with our accepted standards, may be discharged directly back
to the community in an even more advanced mental condition.
He will most likely again become a menace to the community
and may possibly decide to square up accounts and shoot it
out again when he is discharged in 1938. (It is of interest to
note, that this patient has delusions of persecution directed
toward the district attorney.) I can cite instances where I
have personally testified in court that an individual was dangerous and a menace to the community, where legal technicalities and hypothetical questions have confused the omnipotent
jury even more than my testimony and overruled medical opinion and the patient discharged, later on committing violent
anti-social acts. One paranoid woman, promptly after discharge on a plea of habeas corpus, attempted to kill one of
her persecutors.
Another phase of this situation is the question of allowing
numerous psychotic individuals in the penitentiary. We read
some time ago of a dangerous assault in our penitentiary, made
most likely by a psychotic individual. Two other prisoners
were severely injured. Wardens for years have pleaded for
a change in this situation. For instance, at Sing Sing, where
they first organized a psychiatric clinic, it was shown by the
psychiatrist that 12 per cent of the population had been known
to be definitely insane and in addition 18 per cent irresponsible
psychopathic individuals.
I do not know of any more gloomy, irrational, social waste
than our present medico-legal methods of dealing with the
crime situation. It seems to me that it is possible to change
these legal procedures even if it requires constitutional amendment, in order better to co-operate and to co-ordinate a medi-
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cal and legal program to really safeguard the community
from the ravages of the criminal. Surely this is the joint
desire of the splendid psychiatrists, judges and lawyers I have
had the privilege of knowing in Denver and throughout the
state.
I realize the inadequateness of this preliminary report
but would like to suggest in conclusion the following steps
which might be helpful in a state program to deal with our
criminal situation:
1. The elimination of partisan testimony and the socalled battle of experts through approval by legislative action
of the creation of a commission of three psychiatrists appointed by the court. A majority report of this Psychiatric Commission regarding the mental condition of the defendant is to
be accepted by the court. These psychiatrists are not to testify
in court but can be questioned by the judge in the presence of
lawyers on both sides. This would take away the power of the
jury in rendering a verdict concerning medical questions. (In
accordance with the committee reports by the American
Psychiatric Association.) *
2. Through legislative action, chronic offenders and
recidivists should have complete mental examination by the
Psychiatric Commission. Recommendations for the permanent legal detention of repeaters should be made based on
the findings of complete psychiatric studies.
3. The creation of a Psychiatric Clinic in the State Penitentiary and other penal institutions for:
(a)
Classification of all prisoners to acquaint the prison
authorities with their mental characteristics; to help in the
assignment of work; to see that the criminally insane are treated and segregated in an approriate institution, preferably on
the penitentiary grounds.
(b) To be of service to the prisoners themselves through
examinations and treatment, and to help them make adjustment before and after their discharge.
Research work concerning the causes of crime and
(c)
the best methods of treatment and prevention.
*Vote of The National Council of the National Economic League: 813 for,
118 against.
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(d) To establish routine psychiatric examinations of all
prisoners at least one month before they are brought up for
parole or discharge. Parole or discharge to only be granted if
indicated following complete social and psychiatric studies.
In certain types (as in the Ives case) parole should never be
granted. The prisons should create a parole board and no
prisoner should be paroled unless the report of the board is
unanimous. On violation of parole the prisoner should serve
out the rest of his sentence and the maximum for his second
offense and be considered as a second offender (as in Baumes
Law of New York).
4. Arrangements should be made and enforced whereby
the prisoner has regular supervised employment while serving
his sentence. Their earnings should be applied to reimburse
the state for their care and maintenance, to support dependent
relatives and to make restitution to persons injured by their
criminal activities. For this, proper colonization methods
should be developed in Colorado.
5. The passage by the legislature of the Baumes Law
modified so that all repeaters considered to be dangerous in
type by psychiatric examination are promptly segregated for
life, as well as all fourth offenders.
6. The creation of a separate building or wards to care
for the criminally insane at the penitentiary. Arrangements
for the training of lawyers in the relation of criminal law and
psychiatry through a course of instruction should be provided
here. The three law schools of the state should arrange their
curriculum to take in this work, and district attorneys and lawyers specializing in criminal law should serve a period analogous to a medical internship in this institution. (White.)8
7. The positions of judges of criminal courts and district
attorneys should be permanent, appointment being based on
the results of a competitive examination and the fulfillment of
requirements for such positions should consist of a knowledge
of modern criminology and its various ramifications. (White.)
8. Establishment in connection with our courts of adequate probation and statistical facilities.
9. The creation of a Colorado crime commission to conduct careful studies and formulate data as to the causes and
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effects of crime, condition of our present penal institutions,
courts and legal and medical procedures with appropriate
recommendation for legislative enactment. This commission
is to co-operate in every way possible with the National Crime
Commission and should freely utilize the splendid reports
previously published. 9, 10. 11, 12. 13, 14, 15,. 16, 17,. 18
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LAW OFFICE MANAGEMENT
By Jacob V. Shaetzel of the Denver Bar
N writing this article for Dicta, I have in mind the smaller
offices that are doing a general law office business, and not
the large offices where experienced stenographers and
office assistants are in charge. In those offices where the lawyer must make his records, keep his books, assist even at times
with the stenographic work the matter of office management
becomes a problem. Keen competition which we now find
ourselves in, rising cost of labor, rent, supplies, etc., should
make us ascertain if there are cheaper and better ways of doing
things which will expedite the handling of the small and seemingly endless details of the law offices.
If the lawyer of today, big or little, is to make more than
a bare living out of his profession, he must be able to handle
his practice on nearly the same basis as the successful business
man of today. Yet, it was only the other day that I heard a
client remark that if he had to run his business as his lawyer
runs his own, he would soon have no business to run. Whether
or not he was justified in his remarks I will not judge. It is
enough if the client has this in mind.
A small or medium practice must be handled with precision and speed, if it is to pay. No unnecessary delays must
occur. If the case is a court case, it must be ready. Win or
lose it must be disposed of. I believe that there are too many
conferences, postponements, and meetings in the ordinary case.
If a case is set for trial, and not tried, I doubt if the average
lawyer collects one cent more for the wasted time. If a client
has been asked to come in and the lawyer is not ready, more
waste time, and thus we find at the end of the month, while we
have been very busy, we have really been doubling back on
cases.
An authority on law office management has estimated that
the average lawyer has only one thousand hours of time a year
for which a charge can be made. The rest of the time is devoted to drives, charity work, committees of public nature,
etc. I have no doubt of the accuracy of this statement. I
believe it is correct, and hence, it becomes a comparatively
easy matter to figure the value of your time. If you are a
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$3,000.00 a year man you should be charging $3.00 per hour,
plus your overhead. If you want to earn $5,000.00 a year then
charge $5.00 per hour, plus overhead, etc. But if you are
going to reckon on this basis it will be necessary to keep a
record of your time. This is not essential in all cases, but
even where fixing a flat fee I believe it would help the client to
understand better the basis of the fee if a record of things done,
with dates, was handed to him with the bill. I keep a charge
book in my office and it is the ordinary charge slip that is found
in any dry goods store and can be purchased from any stationery firm. A record of the service rendered, day, and time, is
kept and this is charged on a special white ledger sheet which
fits in with the regular cash ledger. It seems to me that our time
and ability are what we have to sell and if they are worth anything, it is worth recording. Once each month, or oftener, I
go through my ledger and then make a charge for the services
rendered, and in billing each month I give an itemized statement of the services rendered, with the dates, and extend the
charge. The notation of time spent is not put on the monthly
statement. If the service rendered is not sufficient to bill for
that month I merely let it go and if within a six month period
or a year the service amounts to $5.00 or more a bill is sent.
It has surprised me to ascertain the amount of services, advice,
etc. that has been previously given without thought of charge.
It has more than paid to carry this out and the client is better
satisfied and he too, at times has expressed the thought that
little did he understand before what a lawyer had to do to
earn his fee.
The telephone is playing a more important part in a lawyer's life than most of us realize. I really believe that nearly
three fourths of our business is being done over the phone.
The client does not desire to take the time to come to the office,
or he feels that the lawyer may not be there if he does come,
or he has gotten so used to conducting his business over the
phone that it has become second nature to him. In any event
until I began recording the messages on my daily charge slips
I did not know why the rent was hard to meet and why my
bills were not being paid. It was because my time was going
for advice on the phone and with a usual "forget it" when the
inquirer asked that a bill be sent. Now, I won't send a bill
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or make a charge for one call, but when those calls persist,
and persist as they do, then indeed I believe I am justified in
making a charge. Telephone consultations are what I call
them, and it is not uncommon to carry one on for twenty
minutes at a time. In fact I believe that the telephone companies have long recognized this fact and are ahead of us.
Statements sent twice each month help to keep the accounts collected. To send a statement promptly on the 1st
or 2nd and then again on the 20th has more than repaid for
the extra work involved. Clients are used to paying on receipt
of statements and they respond more quickly. Then again I
believe that statements sent more frequently, instead of waiting the completion of a case that will take months, perhaps,
have made for more satisfied clients.
Clients desire the lawyer to do business the way a business man does it, and the lawyers who are doing it that way
are generally forging ahead, although the best are having
hard times making both ends meet.
Sixteen years ago there were about four hundred and fifty
lawyers in Denver. Now it is nearer eleven hundred, and our
population has not doubled. Let us stop a few moments and
take stock. Let us find if there are ways of doing business
quicker and better.

LIMITATIONS OF THE POWER OF
COURTS IN INSTRUCTING JURIES
By John H. Dennison of the Denver Bar
(Former Chief Justice, Colorado Supreme Court)

HERE is a persistent idea among the members of the
bar that Colorado courts are forbidden to comment on
or sum up" (as the English say) the evidence, or express any opinion concerning it or the case. But what is the
actual law on that subject here?
The Legislative Assembly of 1861, Laws of 1861, p. 282,
par. 28, enacted the following:
"The District Court, in all cases both civil and criminal, shall only
instruct the petit jury as to the law of the case; * * *."

The whole Act of which this was a part was repealed by
the practice Act of 1868, R. S. 1868, Chap. LXX, p. 520, n.,
and was reenacted as Sec. 28 of the latter Act, which in turn
was repealed by the Code of 1877, Sec. 447. Nothing in the
Code reenacts it, but Sections 173 and 410 of the Code of 1877
contain matter inconsistent with other parts of said Sec. 28.
That Code in substance (Sec. 167) and the present Code
of 1921, Sec. 205, contain the following:
"Before the argument is begun the court shall give such instructions
upon the law to the jury as may be necessary, which instructions shall be in
writing and signed by the judge."

It seems clear that in omitting the word "only" the legislature must be deemed to have altered the meaning and intent
of the statute and that now the court must instruct as to the
law, but is not forbidden to follow the common law practice
of courts in respect to the evidence.
This conclusion finds some support in Section 171 of the
Code of 1877. "After hearing the charge, the jury may" etc.
"Charge" is a word which connotes only the common law
address of the court to the jury. The same provision still appears in Section 210 of our present Code.
It cannot be said then that there is anything in our present
statutes to prevent the common law charge to the jury in a
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civil case, provided it is made in writing. In criminal cases
the old Section 28 of 1861 and 1868 is still in force, C. L. 1921,
par. 7105, the Supreme Court having held that, so far as criminal causes were concerned, the repeal of the section was not
within the terms of the title to the Code, viz: "An Act providing a System of Procedure in Civil Actions in the Courts
of Justice of the State of Colorado." Van Houton v. People,
22 Colo. 53.
What have our courts said about this matter?
Sopris v. Truax, 1 Colo. 89, 91, was reversed because the
court instructed the jury as to the sufficiency of certain evidence. Section 28 of the practice Act of 1868 was cited. This
case, of course, decides nothing with reference to the rule
under the Code.
In Wall v. Livezay, 6 Colo. 550, the Supreme Court declines to predicate error upon the fact that the lower court
called attention to certain evidence favorable to plaintiff, intimating, however, that such practice was not to be encouraged and that it might have been erroneous if the lower court
had omitted to call attention to evidence favorable to defendant, or if it had referred to disputed facts as established.
This, we believe, is the first case on the point in question,
after the passage of the code.
In Gilpin v. Gilpin, 12 Colo. 504, 514, to call especial
attention, in a divorce trial, to the conduct of defendant as
asserted by plaintiff and his witnesses is said not to "meet the
approval" of the Supreme Court but no ruling is based on the
statement.
In Rose v. Otis, 5 Colo. App. 472, 476, it was held that a
statement of a synopsis of plaintiff's evidence was not error.
In Florence Oil Co. v. Huff, a requested instruction which
collated the evidence favorable to defendant but not that
favorable to plaintiff was held to have been properly modified.
So far as we have found, these are the only Colorado cases
which deal directly with references to evidence in instructions;
there have been cases, however, which indirectly affect the results of such instructions; e.g. a line of decisions which condemns bare statements of the law and require or at least recommend that instructions be "concretely stated." Motor Co. v.

DICTA

Walker, 71 Colo. 53. "Concretely" is not here a strictly
definite term, but it must mean at least that the court should
state the relation of the law to the facts which appear in evidence; and, since many cases forbid the court to instruct as to
matters which do not appear in evidence, it necessarily follows
that the court must consider and determine what the evidence
shows or tends to show, and speak to the jury accordingly.
It is clear also, from the trend of the decisions which condemn the mention of evidence favorable to one side without
mention of evidence to the contrary, that a fair and impartial
statement of the evidence on a given point is not prohibited.
These conclusions are reinforced by the cases which hold
that undisputed matters should not be left to the jury. Colo.
Springs Co. v. Gohun, 66 Colo. 149; Heaton v. Nelson, 69
Colo. 320; Martin v. Carruthurs, 69 Colo. 468; Thayer v.
Kirchhof, 83 Colo. 480, 488-9; Small v. Clark, 83 Colo. 211,
215, and cases cited in 38 Cyc. 1667.
It follows, does it not, that the Court must determine and
instruct the jury that certain matters are undisputed, and that
they must take them as proved. A familiar example is a suit
for goods sold and delivered where the defendant, though he
traverses the sale and delivery, yet on trial relies wholly on a
plea of payment or of confession and evidence. No Court
would leave to the jury the question of the sale and delivery,
but would instruct them that the only question for them was
payment vel non.
A synopsis of testimony as in Rose v. Otis, 5 Colo. App.
472, 476, seems to be the same thing as "summing up," 38 Cyc.
1653, and this seems to be expressly permitted; it would seem
too that some prudent and restrained comment on the evidence
would not justify a reversal, but, although we have no final
decision on the point in this state and although no statute forbids it, the impressions of the bench and bar are so strongly
against the expression by the judge of his opinion as to the
weight of evidence or as to the questions in the case that such
expression would probably be held to be prejudicial error.
But what reason is there against full discussion and expression of opinion by the Court? It is done in England, most
of the courts in the East, and in the United States courts every-
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where. It is said to be arbitrary, but it is less so than many
things which the Court does every day.
An example of comment on the evidence so common as
to go almost unnoticed is a direction to disregard certain evidence, but this should, of course, be distinguished from commenting on the weight of the evidence and from analysis or
summing up. It is, however, a more arbitrary act than either
of the other two, and so more subject to objection, yet it is
neither more nor less than sustaining an objection to evidence,
which is a greater power than comment or expression of opinion. Yet the court can go beyond this and grant a non-suit
or direct a verdict, and, more arbitrary yet, can set aside a
verdict after it is rendered.
With these great powers freely recognized as proper to
be exercised, what sound objection can there be to lesser ones
along the same lines?
The fundamental question in regard to this matter, as to
all other matters in trials is: what will further a right decision? Now any twelve men, outside a jury box, seeking a correct decision on any subject, would more surely reach it if they
had the advice of an expert as to the evidence before them
and the advantage of his trained powers of discrimination,
analysis and logic. Why not, then, twelve men inside the box?
Does anybody really believe that a jury is more likely to
render a true verdict without the advice of the Court than
with it? Does any one believe that a jury in our federal court
is less likely to reach the truth than in our state courts?

WHAT IS BECOMING OF THE JURIES?
By Jacob J. Lieberman of the Los Angeles Bar*
OR some time past the Jury system has been hanging in
the balance. A considerable opinion is crystalizing in
this country that the jury system should be put into the
discard, and that this important institution of Magna Charta
should be considered as superfluous in our modern jurisprudence. The age-old debate is being renewed as to the efficacy,
as well as the advisability of the jury system.
California still guarantees, by its Constitution, the right
of trial by jury. In fact, the language of this Constitution is"The right of trial by jury shall be secured to all, and remain
inviolate." How inviolate it is, and how all receive the benefit
of it, is a matter for individual conjecture, when one learns
that before a litigant in a civil action can obtain a jury trial he
must first deposit the fees of the jury, to-wit: the sum of $24.00,
to cover the $2.00 for the first day which each juror is to serve,
and more recently the Presiding Judge of Los Angeles County
announced that the law requires mileage in addition to the
fee; therefore a deposit is now required of $40.00 before the
case will be set for trial to a jury. This deposit must accompany the demand for the trial by jury which must be included
in the so-called setting card, or notice of application for the
setting of the cause for trial. If a jury is not asked for at this
time it is determined to have been waived, and the parties
litigant are not entitled to a trial by jury. No express waiver
is required.
When the case finally comes on for trial the deposit is
used for the first day's jury fees. On the morning of the second day of the trial the party who has demanded the jury
must deposit an additional $24.00 before the trial can proceed
and this money is paid out in cash to the jurors by the Clerk
at the rate of $2.00 each for that day, and in like manner on
the morning of each day's renewal of the trial another $24.00
must be forthcoming before proceedings can be commenced
for the day. What chance does a poor litigant, who does not
come within the pauper class, stand in enforcing his constitutional right, "secured to all," for a trial by jury? One can
" (This is another of the series of articles calling attention to interesting differences and comparisons between the laws of Colorado and California, written especially for Dicta by Mr. Lieberman, formerly of the Denver Bar.)
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readily see that the result of a system of implied waivers of
jury trials by failure to demand a jury at the time of the notice
of setting, and an expensive process such as has just been outlined, is that the number of jury trials in California is being
considerably reduced.
Trial by jury, in other words, is being discouraged in
California. Is this a sign of the tendency of the times?
A former Colorado practitioner cannot help but make a
comparison. Remembering that in Justice Courts in Colorado trial are had to a jury of three, and a jury of six is the
maximum, the extra three being called only upon demand of
the party paying the extra fees, and that in the Courts of
record, a jury of six is called upon the mere demand for a
jury, whereas a special demand for the jury of twelve must be
made, together with a payment of the additional fee entitling
the party to the extra six jurors, one naturally contrasts this
convenient system with the fixed rule in California, for juries
of twelve in all Courts. In California the litigants practically
pay the jurors direct, inasmuch as the Clerk takes the cash
out of the monies deposited by one of the litigants and directly
pays each juror in Court in the case in which he serves. In
Colorado the juror receives his pay from the County and the
jury fund is embellished by the litigant only out of the fixed
fees paid for this purpose, instead of the actual amount paid
to the jurors for the particular day's attendance. In California
the County funds pay only for the criminal juries and for general attendance of jurors not sitting on a particular case. One
of the vagaries of the system is the fact that a juror sitting in
a criminal case receives $3.00 per diem, while the juror sitting
in a civil case in the same building receives $2.00 per diem.
Sometimes a civil jury is drafted to sit in a department to
which has been assigned for trial a criminal case, in order
to relieve the congestion in the regular civil departments.
The Civil jurors in such case who are drafted to sit in the
criminal trial become thus suddenly, and most fortunately,
elevated from the $2.00 class to the $3.00 class.
On the other hand, speaking of numbers of jurors, all
twelve are not required to agree in order to return a verdict in
civil cases in California. The agreement of nine jurors is
sufficient for a verdict. In criminal cases a unanimous verdict
of all twelve is still required.
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In the selection of a jury, twelve jurors are called into
the box. The statement of the case is made and the examination of the jurors as to their qualifications proceeds, and after
challenges for cause are completed the peremptory challenges
are exercised. This is not done by taking the list of jurors and
handing it back and forth from one Attorney to the other, and
silently and secretly striking the undesirable jurors peremptorily challenged, but each counsel has to announce aloud the
name of the juror whom he challenges without announcing his
rhyme or reason therefor. Imagine the feelings of the average
woman juror who is thus excused from the jury box, without
being informed as to the motives or reasons therefor! Imagine
the popularity of a District Attorney who tries one case after
another before the same panel and who, perchance, may have
excused t&~e same juror on more than one occasionl
In criminal cases twenty peremptory challenges are
allowed to each side in cases where the offense is punishable
with death or imprisonment for life. In trials for lesser
offenses ten peremptory challenges are allowed to each side.
(Until the Legislative Session of 1927, the State was entitled
to half the number of challenges which were allowed to the
defense). In civil cases each side is entitled to four peremptory challenges, except in the Justice Courts where they are
entitled to three. In civil cases where there are several defendants joined together, who are denied separate trials, they
must join in their challenges, thus all being entitled, collectively, to but four peremptory challenges.
Grand juries are called once a year and serve a whole
year. How business men who usually are drafted to grand
juries are able to do this is a mystery. Until recently, even
petit juries used to serve for several months. More recently
a new system has been adopted which brings about a better
rotation and calls for approximately two weeks service, as
under the Denver system inaugurated some time ago.
As has been indicated above, and as has by this time been
heralded throughout the world in the reports of the many sensational trials which have been held out here, the California
law provides for women, as well as men, to sit on juries. The
only male jury which one sees now in California is either
accidental or in the Federal Court.
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Arguments of counsel to the jury in summing up the.case
are made prior to the giving of the instructions; in fact almost
invariably prior to the time when the Court has finally settled
the instructions, the Court for the most part completing the
writing and compilation of the instructions while sitting on
the bench during the arguments of the lawyers to the jury.
This has led to such a loose system that very rarely does one
attorney show opposing counsel the courtesy of furnishing him
with a copy of the instructions which he proposes, and seldom,
if ever, does the Court submit his proposed instructions to the
attorneys in the trial, to afford them an opportunity to call the
Court's attention to errors, and perhaps persuade the court to
avoid such errors.
As to the place of the argument, coming before the instructions are read to the jury for settlement, five years of
practice in the California courts have not convinced this
writer that the Colorado system of having the arguments follow reading of the instructions to the jury, is not superior. In
fact, the writer cannot help feeling, after years of experience
with many juries, that the California system makes confusion
worse confounded. The average juror entering the jury box
has certain notions of his own as to what the law is or ought to
be. The attorneys for the plaintiff or the prosecution tell the
jury that the law is something else or that they expect that the
Court will so instruct them. Then come the attorneys for the
defense and tell the jury that the law is something else again,
or that they expect the Court will so instruct them. Then
comes the Court and advises the jurors that the law is perhaps
something far different from what any of them have said. By
that time a bewildered jury is ready to forget all about law
and yield only to instincts; and some times it may happen, as
occurred in one of the Los Angeles courts when a lawyer emphatically announced to the jury in his argument that he was
confident that the Court would instruct them that the law was
thus and so, and an irascible Judge sitting on the bench, unable
to repress his nervous temperament, leaned forward and, interrupting the argument, very forcefully stated-"The Court
will do no such thing!"
Yes, for various reasons, juries are most uncertain quantities !

SHOULD JUSTICES OF THE PEACE
BE MEMBERS OF THE BAR?
By John C. Vivian of the Denver Bar
HERE is the attorney who, at some time in his practice, has not deplored the fact that there is no provision
in our law requiring Justices of the Peace to be members of the bar?
Where is the lawyer who has not seen justice fly out of
the window unrestrained after he has pleaded his case in a
strictly professional and adequate fashion only to find that his
words have fallen on deaf ears, so far as their legal effect was
concerned before the layman presiding?
The Constitution of Colorado, Article 14, Section 11, provides as follows:
"There shall be elected at the same time at which members of the general assembly are selected, beginning with the year nineteen hundred and
four, two justices of the peace and two constables in each precinct in each
county, who shall hold their office for a term of two years; Provided, That
in precincts containing fifty thousand (50,000) or more inhabitants, the
number of justices and constables may be increased as provided by law. The
term of offices of all justices of the peace, that expires in January, 1904, is
hereby extended to the second Tuesday in January, 1905. This section shall
govern, except as hereafter otherwise expressly directed, or permitted by
constitutional enactment."

An examination of this section reveals that nothing therein sets forth any qualifications whatsoever for the office of
Justice of the Peace. County assemblies of political parties
pay little or no attention to the nomination of men for this
office and it happens not infrequently that the office goes begging. This is especially true in the rural districts.
There is little dignity in the office. The emolument for
the most part, is negligible. In the sparsely settled communities of the state, the justice is usually a man of mature years
who operates the office in conjunction with a real estate, insurance, or other business. He does not ordinarily have
enough cases to familarize himself with procedure or practice.
Naturally, in electing the class of men who occupy, for
the most part, the office of Justice of the Peace in Colorado,
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we can expect but small and restricted efficiency in the functioning of this class of courts. This is especially true from the
standpoint of the practicing attorney who is wont to prepare
his cases for presentation and trial in the justice court the
same as he would in a court of record.
In such instances, the Court and the attorney do not meet
on equal terms. Their vocations are different, their training
is not alike and their viewpoint upon the various aspects which
a trial may assume are not the same. When a member of the
bar approaches the judge of any District Court in the state,
he knows that the technical legal things he is bound to say
will receive a sympathetic understanding and consideration
from the Court. This is mostly true in the County tribunals
in Colorado. But in the average Justice of the Peace Court,
cities and large towns excepted, there is usually an utter lack
of comprehension of the legal requirements which must necessarily form the basic groundwork upon which the settlement
of any controversy is to be predicated.
The justices under our present practice very seldom keep
any books or make the required reports to the County Commissioners; they are inexperienced in taxing fees and costs and
they very commonly misunderstand or misinterpret their jurisdiction. In many instances they attempt to fill out forms,
blanks, findings, and decrees without proper knowledge and
advice, resulting in confusion and disorder which some competent attorney must later disentangle. Many times they overreach their authority. Entries in official account books are
often erroneous and preliminary matters often invalidate subsequent procedure in a higher court.
Presenting a legal argument to the average justice is a
waste of time because, without the requisite legal training, decisions and precedents mean nothing to him. Nor is the justice personaly to blame. It is the system. The ordinary Justice of the Peace does the best he can. Few are the instances
of wilful misconduct of justices in office. They are usually
good men, but lacking in the training and temperament for the
judicial job.
Even though the government found it expedient to make
cooks out of newspaper writers in the military service during
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the world war, it does not follow that a similar course should
be adopted in achieving that degree of efficiency in the administration of justice, in our courts not of record, which the
bar has an inherent right to expect.
This brings us to the question of the feasibility of amending the Constitution to provide that justices of the peace shall
be "learned in the law" to conform to the requirements of the
higher branches of our judiciary.
It would involve a sweeping change in our present system and would be fraught with many obstacles. In order that
the ends of justice may be best served, it is essential; but considered from a political or practical standpoint, there might
develop many objections to a change so radical.
The office would, perhaps, need to be elevated to a higher
class if the legal requirement should be adopted, for no lawyer
of any standing would consent to take the ordinary justice job
at the emolument which the present fee system provides.

COLORADO SUPREME COURT DECISIONS
(EDITORS NoTE.-It is intended in each issue of DIcTA to print brief abstracts
of the decisions of the Supreme Court. These abstracts will be printed only after the
time within which a petition for rehearing may be filed has elapsed without such action being taken, or in the event that a petition for rehearing has been filed the abstract
will be printed only after the petition has been disposed of.)

BOXING COMMISSION-DISCRIMINATION

-

CONSTITUTIONAL

LAW-No. 11969.-Antlers Athletic Association vs. Hartung, et al, as Members of State Boxing Commission-Decided December 31, 1928.
Facts.-The Athletic Association is a non-profit corporation organized for the purpose of conducting boxing exhibitions, the profits of which are turned over to various charities
under the auspices of the Benevolent and Protective Order
of Elks. This action was brought to test the validity of the
statute permitting boxing exhibitions, providing for a Boxing Commission, and prescribing that no such exhibition shall
be conducted unless 5% of the gross receipts are paid as a tax
and unless the promoter of the exhibitions owns the place
where they are to take place or has a lease for at least one year.
Various ex-service men's organizations are excepted from
these provisions and the Association contends that this is an
unconstitutional discrimination.
Held.-Exhibitions such as prize fighting, which are conducive to disorder, may be forbidden altogether by the statute and are subject to regulation by the legislature, which
may prescribe conditions under which such exhibitions may be
given. The alleged discrimination in favor of ex-service
men's organizations is within the discretion of the legislature.
Judgment Affirmed.
CANCELLATION OF INSTRUMENTS-FAILURE

OF CONSIDERA-

TION.-No. 12201.-Charles Fischer vs. Robert J. Hill.Decided January 21, 1929.
Facts.-The plaintiff below signed a note for $1500, payable to the defendants, and the trust deed securing the same.
One Siener negotiated the loan, and caused the trust deed to
be recorded. The plaintiffs were borrowing the money represented by the note from the defendants, and the loan was
arranged through Siener. Defendants gave him the cash and
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plaintiffs gave him the note and trust deed. He appropriated
the money, recorded the trust deed and kept the note. Three
days later he was arrested and was sent to the penitentiary. In
the lower court a question as to whose agent Siener was was
submitted to the jury, which found that he was acting as agent
for the defendants. The evidence was conflicting.
Held.-The evidence being conflicting and the matter
having been properly submitted to the jury, their finding
that Siener was the agent of the defendants will not be disturbed and that finding necessitates the conclusion that there
was a failure of consideration as the plaintiffs received nothing for the execution of the note and trust deed.
Judgment Affirmed.
CORPORATIONS-POWER

OF DIRECTORS TO MORTGAGE PROP-

ERTY.-No. 12,176.-Metalloid Company vs. Luboil Refining Company et al.-Decided January 21, 1929.
Facts.-The Luboil Company being indebted to the
Metalloid Company on an open account borrowed an
additional amount, and pursuant to a resolution of the Board
of Directors, the Vice President and Secretary of the
Luboil Company executed and delivered its promissory note
for the combined amounts, payable to the order of the Metalloid Company, and also delivered a mortgage to secure the
payment of the note. The Luboil Company is a manufacturing corporation and the mortgage covered all of its property.
The matter was never considered at any meeting of the stockholders, nor was any stockholders meeting called for that purpose. The Metalloid Company brought suit to foreclose the
mortgage, and certain stockholders of the Luboil- Company
intervened and resisted the foreclosure.
Held.--That Section 2263 Compiled Laws of 1921 is for
the protection of stockholders, and a mortgage executed in
violation of such provisions will be declared void. In the instant case there having been no stockholders meeting and the
mortgage not having been submitted to the stockholders as
provided for by Section 2263, the mortgage is not good as to
them and cannot be foreclosed. The fact that some of the
directors were also stockholders does not obviate the difficulty

DICTA

for they acted as directors and not as stockholders. The statute need not be pleaded but is one of which the Courts take
judicial notice.
Judgment Affirmed.
12168.-Dixon vs. Bowen.Decided January 28, 1929.
Facts.-The plaintiff brought an action to recover damages as the result of a conspiracy formed and carried out by
the defendants whereby in an action unlawfully brought by
one of the defendants against the plaintiff, all of the defendants fraudulently with intent to cheat and defraud the plaintiff
procured a judgment against him on an alleged debt which
the plaintiff did not owe, and enforced the same by wrongful
seizure and sale of his automobile. A demurrer was filed to
the complaint and whether the complaint stated facts sufficient
to constitute a cause of action was raised. The lower court
sustained the demurrer.
Held.-The Complaint clearly states facts sufficient to
constitute a cause of action for fraudulently making use of
legal proceedings. It is not a suit to set aside the judgment
upon which the legal process issued, but is clearly an action
which in itself recognizes the judgment, but proceeds on the
theory that the judgment has been paid in law and satisfied,
and the plaintiff seeks judgment to recover damages for the
fraud of the defendants in procuring it.
Judgment Reversed.
FRAUD--LEGAL PROCESS.-No.

12167.-David vs. Gilbert.-Decided January 28, 1929.
Facts.-Action to recover damages for breach of contract. The plaintiff and defendant entered into a contract for
the sale and purchase and trade of certain automobiles. The
plaintiff alleged a full compliance with the terms of the contract on his part, and that the defendants refused to deliver
the new automobile and refused to return the consideration
paid at the execution of the contract. The defendant denied
that the plaintiff had complied and stated that the plaintiff
had failed to sign an order as required on the original conPRACTICE-PLEADING.-No.
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tract. The plaintiff's replication denied all new matter. The
plaintiff admitted that he had not signed an order, but stated
that the defendant was fully familiar with the type of car,
and that the defendant had waived that requirement. The
case was tried to a jury resulting in a verdict in favor of the
plaintiffs. Defendant filed a motion for judgment non obstante
veredicto, and also a motion to set aside the verdict and grant
a new trial. Both motions were denied and judgment was
entered in accordance with the verdict.
Held.-A motion for judgment non obstante veredicto is
a motion belonging peculiarly to a plaintiff, and should not be
considered when interposed by the defendant. There was no
error in the refusal to sustain said motion, neither was there
any error in the admissibility of evidence. The pleadings
clearly raised an issue of all matters and the answer in itself
made a complete issue, and nothing could be added by alleging as new matter what had already been made an issue in
the case by denial.
Judgment Affirmed.
TAXATION

-

EXTENT FOR HIGH SCHOOL DISTRICT.

-

No.

12269.--Curtis vs: Montrose High School District-Decided January 11, 1929.
Facts.-The Trial Court awarded a peremptory writ of
mandamus directing Curtis as County Assessor of Montrose
County to extend upon his books a levy of 5 mills for the current expenses of the Montrose County High School District.
The Board of County Commissioners made a levy of 5 mills,
which is 1 mill in excess of the limit prescribed in Sections
8411 and 8412 of the Compiled Laws. The Colorado Tax
Commission approved the increase to 5 mills, but the Assessor
extended the levy for 4 mills only, refusing to extend it for
S mills, and brings the decision of the Trial Court granting
the peremptory writ of mandamus to the Supreme Court for
review.
Held.--That Sections 8411 and 8412 of the Compiled
Laws of 1921 control the facts in this case, and Section 7216
of the Compiled Laws of 1921 does not afford the right to an
additional levy. The tax for High School purposes, under
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the law and under all of the Sections above referred to, may
not legally exceed 4 mills.
Judgment Reversed.
TROVER-FRAUD AS DEFENSE-RIPENED FRUIT AS SUBJECT.-

No. 12252.-Koerner et al. vs. Wilson-Decided January
14, 1929.
Facts.-Wilson brought suit against Koerner, who was
the Sheriff of Fremont County, and against Chillino, who
was a judgment creditor of the plaintiff's father, in trover for
the wrongful seizure by the defendant of certain property in
the possession of the plaintiff, which belonged to the plaintiff
to-wit: apples and apple boxes, some of the apples being on
the ground and some on the tree. Judgment was entered for
plaintiff and defendant appealed.
Held.-That the defense of fraud in an action of trover
must be affirmatively pleaded and proved.
Ripened fruit, though still on the tree, is under the circumstances of this case fructus industriales and properly the
basis of an action in trover, being personal property.
Judgment Affirmed.

RECENT TRIAL COURT DECISIONS
(EDiTOR'S NoTB.-It is intended in each issue of Dicta to note any interesting decisions of the United States District Court, the Denver District Court, the County
Court, the Juvenile Court, and occasionally the Justice Courts.)

DENVER DISTRICT COURT-No. 99562, Div. I.-City and
County of Denver vs. William S. Lail and Federal Surety
Company-James C. Starkweather, Judge.
Facts.-Action by City to recover, on Lail's bond as Public Trustee, moneys received by Lail and not paid over in the
sum of $7,233.60, and a penalty of 25% thereon, together with
interest. On and prior to July 23, 1924, Lail was Clerk and
Recorder, Ex-officio Clerk of the City and County of Denver,
appointed thereto by the Mayor at a salary of $2500.00 a year,
as fixed by the Charter. On that date, the Mayor in writing
appointed Lail to be "Public Trustee of the City and County
of Denver". Lail and the Federal Surety Company as surety
executed a bond reciting Lail's appointment "to the office of

DICTA

Public Trustee" and conditioned upon the faithful performance by Lail of all official duties required of him by law and
the payment of all moneys that came "into his hands as such
Public Trustee of the City and County of Denver". From
July 23, 1924, to June 15, 1927, when he resigned, Lail had
performed the duties of Clerk and Recorder and also of Public Trustee, and had been paid the Clerk and Recorder's regular salary of $2500.00 per year. During this period, he collected, as Public Trustee, the sum of $44,368.89, and had
paid over this amount to the treasury of the City, except
$7,233.60, which he withheld as the balance of salary due him
as Public Trustee. Lail's answer included a counter-claim
for $7,233.60 on the basis that he was entitled to $2500.00 a
year as Clerk and Recorder and $5,000.00 a year as Public
Trustee.
Held.-Lail, as Clerk and Recorder, was entitled to receive the salary of $2500.00 per annum attached to that office
under the City Charter, but was not entitled to any additional
compensation for performing the services required of the
former county officer known as Public Trustee. Under Article XX of the Colorado Constitution and People vs. Cassiday,
S0 Colo. 503 and other cases cited, there exist in the Municipality of the City and County of Denver no county offices or
officers as such, although the duties and functions appertaining
to county offices remain intact, and under Chambersvs. People,
70 Colo. 496, and Walsh vs. People, 72 Colo. 406, the office of
Public Trustee is a county office. People vs. Sabin, 75 Colo.
545, thus held that the Governor had no power to appoint a
Public Trustee for the City and County of Denver and that,
as the Charter failed to designate an officer of the City and
County of Denver who should perform the acts and duties
required of the county officer known as Public Trustee, as
contemplated by Sec. 2 of Article XX of the Constitution,*
*Sec. 2. OFFICERS.-The officers of the city and County of Denver shall be
such as by appointment or election may be provided for by the charter; and the jurisdiction, term of office, duties and qualifications of all such officers shall be such as
in the charter may be provided; but every charter shall designate the officers who
shall, respectively, perform the acts and duties required of county officers to be done by
the constitution or by the general law, as far as applicable. If any officer of said city
and county of Denver shall receive any compensation whatever, he or she shall receive the same as a stated salary, the amount of which shall be fixed by the charter,
and paid out of the treasury of the city and county of Denver in equal monthly payments.
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the power of appointment was in the Mayor under the provisions of the Charter. It thereupon became the duty of the
Mayor to appoint some person to perform the acts and duties
required of the former county officer known as the Public
Trustee. In doing so, the Mayor could either have appointed
some person who was not already a municipal officer of the
City and County of Denver to perform such acts and duties,
and a person so appointed would thereby have become a municipal officer of the City and County of Denver; or, on the other
hand, the Mayor could appoint, as he did, some person who
already held a municipal office of the City and County of
Denver to perform, in addition to the duties of his office, the
acts and duties required of the former county officer known
as the Public Trustee. The latter course would be in strict
accord with the purpose of sec. 2 of Article XX. The Charter
definitely fixes the compensation of Clerk and Recorder at
$2500.00 per annum, and this Lail received. There is no
provision, however, allowing additional salary in the event
that the Clerk and Recorder, or anyone, should be appointed,
as a municipal officer, to perform the acts and duties of the
former county officer known as the Public Trustee. Ordinarily where an officer holds two offices, he is entitled to receive
the compensation attached to each, but under the provisions of
Article XX and of the City Charter, a different rule prevails,
and a municipal officer of the City and County of Denver is
entitled to only a single salary. To hold that Lail was entitled to a salary of $5,000.00, or any salary, for the services
rendered as Public Trustee, would be in violation of secs. 108,
304, 311 and 312 of the City Charter, and would be contrary
to the end sought to be accomplished by the enactment of
Article XX of the Constitution. The action being on the
bond, the condition of which. does not cover the 25% penalty,
judgment is entered against the defendants for $7,233.60 with
interest.-Judgmentfor Plaintiff.

IaLEGALSTENOGRAPHER2

:Business

Call MaiM 6505

.Kens 2earin6douse

•2t3,W~idland Savings building.-Detnvent

